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Abstract. In a simple two-node, one origin-destination network with
multiple links, we characterize the coincidence of system optimum, that
minimizes the total cost of agents with user equilibrium, that equalizes
the cost in each (used) link. If cost functions are, up to a constant,
homogeneous of the same degree then the system optimum and the user
equilibrium are the same if and only if the freeflows are costant. Some
examples show that the hypotheses are not redundant.
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1 Introduction
We consider a model of traffic flow on a network whose roads are used by non-
cooperative agents that travel from an origin to a destination, minimizing their
own travel time or another suitable cost function. It is well know that the selfish
user equilibrium in a traffic network can differ substantially from the globally
optimal flow that makes the incurred total (or average) cost minimal. This is
due to the different perspective used by the travellers: selfish agents select their
route to minimize their own travel time with no regard to the congestion burden
they put on others. As this externality is not taken into account, the resulting
user equilibrium can be largely different from a system optimum, that is an ef-
ficient global allocation minimizing the total cost in the network. This feature
is important for the clever design of new or improved networks, in the sense
that the behaviour of the users must be taken into consideration, as the Braess
paradox strikingly shows, [3] or chapter 6 in [1] for a colloquial presentation
whose terminology is repeated in this paper. Along the same research line, other
curious and puzzling effects are documented in [4] and [5] where it is shown that
? We thank Marco Li Calzi for drawing our attention on homogeneous cost func-
tions and two anonymous referees for useful remarks. All errors are (sadly) ours:
paolop@unive.it, amsorato@unive.it
14 Paolo Pellizzari and Annamaria Sorato
polluting emissions can increase even when traffic demand decreases or when a
link with zero emissions is added to certain networks.
Recent research work has compared the two equilibria, trying to quantify
the extent of the increment of total travelling cost due to the selfish “lack of
regulation”, as it is dubbed in [8]. Clearly, a system optimum can be obtained
enforcing the users to select the appropriate paths, but this has huge coordination
costs and would inevitably cause reactions by the agents that are routed along
costly (or time consuming) roads. It is in fact very unlikely that an agent tolerates
higher costs for the sake of social benefit, when other “equal” users have smaller
costs. Enforcement seldom being a useful and realistic policy, efforts have aimed
to suggest alternative paths to travellers by radio broadcasts or various signalling
devices and adoption of pricing policies.
As theoretical and experimental work, [9], stress the ubiquitousness of sub-
optimal selfish equilibria, we are interested in this paper in exploring situations
in which the system optimum and the user equilibrium are the same. In detail,
we investigate the properties a traffic network should possess to ensure that the
two equilibria coincide. This is of obvious interest to a central planner that might
modify the network (for example adding or deleting links and adjusting the link
costs) in order to exploit the greedy behaviour of the users to achieve maxi-
mal efficiency with no visible action (other that proper network construction
or modification) or enforcement. To the best of our knowledge, determination
of conditions such that system optima are the same than user equilibria has
received no attention in the literature.
We address the problem in a simplified setting with only two nodes, one
origin-destination pair and multiple paths, that in this case can also be thought
as edges or links. The situation is of interest in cases where a heavy traffic de-
mand from the origin to the destination splits in various routes with no common
intersection. The simple structure of the network indeed allows Selten and coau-
thors to develop an experimental study in an identical framework that is studied
also in [7].
Our main results shows that from same degree homogeneity of the cost func-
tions up to a constant, it follows that positive system optima are also user
equilibria if and only if there are constant freeflows (the cost incurred when the
flow on the link is null).
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
of a traffic problem on a network in a rather standard way, defines the user
equilibrium (UE) and the system optimum (SO) and gives some useful lemmas.
In the following Section, we state our main result for a two-nodes network with
homogeneous costs up to a constant. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to provide
some examples and remarks.
2 The model
We consider a directed network G = (V,E) with vertex set V and edge set
E. We restrict our attention to the simple case of unique source-target pair,
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Fig. 1. The network G and some paths linking the unique origin-destination pair.
Agents travel from left to right, incurring some congestion-dependent cost.
setting V = {O, T } and assume there are k edges (roads) linking O to T . The
contribution of each single agent travelling on G is negligible and we assume
that unitary traffic is flowing on the network. Define a flow x as a k−tuple of
nonnegative real values x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) such that
∑k
j=1 xj = 1, where each
xj is the fraction of (total) load travelling along the j−th edge. This description
is, up to a normalization, equivalent to the widely used approach that prescribes
some total travel demandN in such a way that qj travellers are on j−th path and∑
j qj = N . Each edge e ∈ E = {e1, e2, . . . , ek} is equipped with a differentiable
and nondecreasing cost function Cj(x). We assume that the form of the cost
function on one edge takes the form Cj(x) = aj + Dj(x), with Dj(0) = 0 and
aj ≥ 0, in such a way that the cost can be split in two parts: the constant aj ,
often named freeflow, is the cost incurred when null flow is travelling on the arc,
and the term Dj(x) penalizing heavy load. Trivially, the functions Dj inherit the
smoothness properties of the costs Cj and are differentiable and nondecreasing.
Figure 1 shows a stylized graph of the network.
There are two interesting situations in such a network: a selfish user equilib-
rium, where agents equally spread congestion on all used links and an efficient
system optimum that minimizes the sum (or, equivalently, the mean) of the
incurred costs.
Definition 1 (User Equilibrium). A nonnegative flow x = (x1, . . . , xk) is a
User Equilibrium (UE) if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that xi > 0 and δ ∈ [0, xi],
we have
∑
h xh = 1 and
Ci(xi) ≤ Cj(xj + δ).
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Loosely speaking, for each pair of edges, one’s cost increases moving from one
edge to another. In particular, if x is a UE then all used edges have the same
cost, [6].
Lemma 1. Let x be an UE. Then
Cj(xj) = λ,
for all j such that xj > 0.
Definition 2 (System Optimum). A flow x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
k) is a System Op-
timum (SO) if it solves the optmization problem
min
x1, . . . , xk∑
j xj = 1
x1, . . . , xk ≥ 0
C(x) =
k∑
j=1
xjCj(xj). (1)
The existence of a UE was established in [2], assuming that the cost function
of each network link is continuous and nondecreasing in the flow. Moreover,
boundedness of the feasible region and continuity of cost functions ensure, by
Weierstrass theorem, that a SO exists.
In the next section we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for an UE
to be also a SO and viceversa. The following lemma will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 2. Let the cost functions be such that, for every j = 1, . . . , k
Cj(x) > aj , for all x > 0;
Cj(0) = a, ∀j.
Then
A1. The UE x is such that xj > 0, j = 1, . . . , k, i.e. all links are used by the
agents. In brief, x > 0.
A2. The SO x∗ is such that x∗j > 0, j = 1, . . . , k, i.e. nonnegative constraints are
not binding. In brief, x∗ > 0.
Proof. Let x = (x1, . . . , xk) be an UE. By contradiction, we assume without loss
of generality that x1 = 0 and x2 > 0. Noting that D2(x2) > 0, by continuity of
D1, there exists δ such that
∀x ∈]0, δ[, 0 < D1(x) < D2(x2).
Hence, there exists a positive δ < x2 such that
C2(x2) > C1(x1 + δ) = C1(δ),
contradicting the assumption that x is UE.
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Let us now assume that x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
k) be a SO. By contradiction, we
assume without loss of generality that x∗1 = 0 and x
∗
2 > 0. We will show that x
∗
cannot be optimal showing that moving some amount  of flow from link 2 to 1
reduces the objective function. In other words, we claim that
C(, x∗2 − , x
∗
3, . . . , x
∗
k) < C(x
∗) for some  > 0.
Consider the sum of the first two terms in the summation (1)
x∗1C1(x
∗
1) + x
∗
2C2(x
∗
2) = x
∗
2(a+D2(x
∗
2))
to be compared to
C1() + (x
∗
2 − )C2(x
∗
2 − ) = (a+D1()) + (x
∗
2 − )(a+D2(x
∗
2 − )).
Using the definition of the Cj ’s and a Taylor expansion, the right hand side
yields
a+  (D1(0) + D
′
1(0) + o()) +
+ x∗2a+ x
∗
2 (D2(x
∗
2)− D
′
2(x
∗
2) + o())
− a−  (D2(x
∗
2)− D
′
2(x
∗
2) + o()) .
Simplifying and omitting higher order terms we obtain
x∗2(a+D2(x
∗
2))− 
(
x∗2D
′
2(x
∗
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+D2(x
∗
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
< x∗2(a+D2(x
∗
2)),
contradicting the optimality of x∗. 2
Some remarks are in order. A1 rules out the existence of links that are not
used by selfish agents. This does not mean that the links with null flow in an UE
are not used in a SO. Indeed, it is well known that there are situations where
A2 holds even though A1 does not, as some social benefit can often be obtained
rerouting a portion of the traffic on links that would not have been used on a
selfish basis.
The previous result basically shows that if the aj ’s are constant then both
x and x∗ have strictly positive components (i.e. A1 and A2 always hold). In
the following section we give our main result, stating that in the presence of
homogeneous Dj ’s, positive SO and UE coincide if and only if the freeflows are
constant.
3 Identity of SO and UE
This section is devoted to characterize the networks that admit coincident SO
and UE’s.
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Proposition 1. Assume the functions Dj be homogeneous of degree p > 0 on
R+, nondecreasing and not identically null. Then x > 0 is a SO and a UE if
and only if aj ≡ a, j = 1, . . . , k i.e. the aj’s are constant.
Proof. The assumptions of homogeneous, nondecreasing and not identically null
Dj ’s imply that (see [10])
Dj(x) = βjx
p, βj > 0, j = 1, . . . , k.
In particular, as each term xjCj is a convex function, it follows that the objective
function C(x) in (1) is convex. Hence, being convex the optimization problem for
the SO, the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) first order conditions are necessary and sufficient
for a solution, see [11].
Assume x > 0 is both a SO and an UE. Then by Lemma 1 we have
aj +Dj(xj) = λ, j = 1, . . . , k
k∑
j=1
xj = 1. (2)
As x is SO also KT conditions must hold, hence
aj +Dj(xj) + xjD
′
j(xj)− ξ − µj = 0, (3)
k∑
j=1
xj = 1,
xj ≥ 0, µj ≥ 0,
xjµj = 0,
∀j = 1, . . . , k,
where ξ, µ1, . . . , µk are suitable multipliers. Using Euler’s theorem for homoge-
neous functions and observing that x > 0 implies µj = 0, j = 1, . . . , k, equation
(3) can be rewritten as
aj + (1 + p)Dj(xj)− ξ = 0.
Recalling from (2) thatDj(xj) = λ−aj and substituting in the previous equation
gives
aj + (1 + p)(λ− aj)− ξ = 0, j = 1, . . . , k.
Hence
aj =
λ(1 + p)− ξ
p
,
which is a constant independent of j.
Assume now that aj ≡ a and let x
∗ be a SO: we want to show that it is also
a UE and x∗ > 0. As before, the KT conditions for the problem (1) hold at x∗:
a+ (1 + p)Dj(x
∗
j )− ξ − µj = 0, (4)
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k∑
j=1
x∗j = 1,
x∗j ≥ 0, µj ≥ 0,
x∗jµj = 0,
∀j = 1, . . . , k,
By Lemma 2, x∗ > 0 and this in turn gives µj = 0, j = 1, . . . , k. Then Dj(x
∗
j ) =
(ξ − a)/(1 + p) for all j and x∗ is also an UE by Lemma 1.
Finally, assume that x is an UE (and still aj ≡ a). Strict positiveness of x is
an immediate consequence of Lemma 2. Then Dj(xj) = λ for all j. We want to
show that,
(x, ξ, µ1, . . . , µk) = (x1, . . . , xk, ξ, 0, . . . , 0), for some ξ, (5)
is a full solution of KT conditions for a SO. Plugging (5) into the KT conditions
gives
a+ (1 + p)Dj(xj)− ξ = 0,
k∑
j=1
xj = 1,
xj ≥ 0, µj ≥ 0,
xjµj = 0,
∀j = 1, . . . , k,
that is trivially satisfied if we set ξ = (1+p)λ+a. By sufficiency of KT conditions,
we can conclude that x is a SO. 2
4 Examples and discussion
This section provides some simple (counter)examples to demonstrate that all the
assumptions are required and gives some conclusive remarks.
Example 1. Let C1(x) = 10 + 10x,C2(x) = 30 + 10x. Then it is immediate
to show that the UE and SO are identical, x = (1, 0) = x∗. Though UE coincides
with SO, x∗ is not positive and Proposition 1 does not hold being a1 = 10 6=
30 = a2.
It is very easy to find networks with non constant freeflows that have different
SO and UE, but even in the (rare) cases when x∗ = x, Example 1 shows that
x∗ is not necessarily positive.
The following example stresses that the assumption of homogeneity of same
degree p is essential.
Example 2. Let C1(x) = 10+10x,C2(x) = 25/2+10x
2. Some computations
show that
x =
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= x∗ > 0,
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but nevertheless the aj’s are different.
We conclude the paper with a final consideration. Homogeneity of the Dj ’s
is a rather acceptable and widely used assumption on the cost functions. With
some additional technical hypotheses, we characterize the identity of SO and
UE completely in terms of constant freeflows. Most of the traffic networks have
however widely different freeflows and this is in total agreement with the well
known fact that coincidence of UE and SO is a very rare event. Proposition 1
could hopefully suggest proper behaviour when links of an existing network are
modified or added by a central planner. If efficiency is desidered, then an effort
should be done in order to achieve costant freeflows as this situation would ‘force’
unaware selfish agents to adopt socially optimal flows without any explicit form
of imposition.
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